The Control of Information

How the rich and powerful shape the media and control your mind. By Dr. Judith Brown.

The British Government Part 3.

Non-Governmental Organisation (NGOs), think tanks, spies, and censorship policies.

“I wonder what would happen if everyone suddenly woke up together and realized they’d been living in an invisible prison run by greedy psychopaths.”― Sol Luckman, Cali the Destroyer.

This week’s article exposes activities of large British NGOs that are part of the disinformation industry, and work with the UK and foreign governments. Many have close relationships with intelligence services. They all have a large reach in censoring opinions, including smearing people and organisations whose opinions they do not support.

The Centre for Countering Digital Hate (CCDH).

According to the website of CCDH, its mission is to protect human rights and civil liberties online. It was founded in 2019 and is registered by Companies House as a private company limited by guarantee. In 2021, a US branch of CCDH was registered as a not-for-profit organisation and according to tax records, CCDH received income of $1.47 million in its first year of operating in USA. Its UK accounts were not located but CCDH website states it is funded by philanthropic associations and individual donors. CCDH claims it does not accept money from social media companies. Despite calls for CCDH to disclose its funders and its interactions with social media, no response has been received [1] here. However, a recent investigation by DataRepublican.com has revealed that CCDH has received funds from at least 17 organisations that are heavily funded by the US taxpayer. This includes the National Endowment for Democracy, Freedom House, National Democratic Institute, World Vision, and Princeton and Columbia Universities. The investigation revealed a ‘coordinated pipeline of financial influence’. This included US intelligence entities, UK Crown interest, and Soros backed organisations. CCDH is also funded by a large network of philanthropic UK NGOs, some of which are funded by the UK government [2] here.

CCDH website describes its functions as research, campaigns, communications, and partnerships with policy makers, and on its website emphasis is on online safety and reforming information systems [3] here. However, the minutes of a CCDH meeting was leaked to two American journalists; the meeting agenda included to ‘kill Twitter’, to focus on advertising, to trigger UK and EU regulatory action, and to progress towards change in the USA [4] here. The advertising reference may refer to activities of CCDH’s defunding partner, outlined below.

CCDH is headed by Imran Ahmed, previously a political adviser to various Labour politicians. Ahmed is also associated with a UK fact check platform, Infotagion, whose supporters also include many government officials [5] here. According to investigative journalist Paul Thacker, Ahmed left the Labour Party in 2019 to run two ‘dark money groups’, Stop Funding Fake News (SFFN) and the CCDH [6] here.

Other members of the CCDH board include Simon Clark, a resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) [8], which was revealed to be involved with projects that conspired with the US federal government to censor speech on social media [7] here. Two members have links with the Lighthouse Management and Media, a firm that was involved with pressurising young people to take Covid-19 vaccinations. Another is Damien Green, former Conservative MP, who has also served as a minister in various capacities, including a period in the Department of Culture, Media and Sport. He has been involved in controversies including sexual harassment allegations and was found to have pornographic images on his computer [8] here.

The first time CCDH came to public attention was in 2021 when it produced a report that resulted in Twitter taking action on accounts named in its report, including Robert F. Kennedy Junior, a US presidential candidate, doctors, and health professionals. The report was cited by White House press secretary, who stated that twelve people were producing 65% of what was described as ‘anti-vaccine disinformation’ on social media platforms [9] here. Although a Facebook executive stated that the report was free of evidence, ‘anti-vax’ was not defined, and CCDH failed to explain how they came up with numbers and conclusions, the narrative hardened. Despite the lack of evidence Facebook accounts belonging to these individuals were removed [10] here.

The SFFN has been instrumental in diverting adverting revenue away from unfavoured news outlets, or demonetarising them, for example, it contributed to the decline of the left-wing Canary that then supported the Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn [11] here. A spokesperson for the Canary pointed out that they were fully regulated, whereas SFFN operated in the shadows, without any regulation or requirement to disclose funders. Canary also stated that SFFN was launched by Morgan McSweeney, Kier Starmer’s chief of staff. At this time, Starmer was predicted to take on the role of the Labour Party leadership if Corbyn resigned [12] here.

A journalist, Paul Holden, reported that he had obtained leaked documents on CCDH activities going back several years. Three tactics of CCDH stand out: to smear opponents with accusations of bigotry or homophobia; use of guilt by association narratives; and close coordination with incurious mainstream media. Holden alleged that CCDH attacks those on the left and the right. Holden quoted journalist Branko Marcetic of Jacobin who claimed that Ahmed alleged that everyone from Jeremy Corbyn to Donald Trump, to the Leave supporters, the Gilets Jaunes and the ‘alt right’ were a single movement allied to ‘hate’. All of these named groups and individuals were critical of CCDH’s brand [13] here.

Centre for Information Resilience (CIR)

CIR claims to be a counter-disinformation unit, but evidence shows ties to British and foreign intelligence. The London based CIR, founded in 2020, states on its website that it is an ‘independent, non-profit enterprise dedicated to countering disinformation, exposing human rights abuses, and combating online behaviour harmful to women and minorities’ [14] here. Their methods to achieve their goals are descried as research, social media analysis, digital investigations, building capacity with local partners, and collaboration with the media.

The two founders, Ross Burley and Adam Rutland, remain as directors. Burley has served in government disinformation projects in London, Washington and Tel Aviv. He also worked as part of the Zinc Network, part of the UK government’s much criticised Prevent strategy, whose stated mission is to prevent the radicalisation of young people. Rutland worked in the Foreign Office’s Communication and Engagement Department and as a diplomat [15] here. He was also named several times in the Integrity Initiative leak, an organisation that was involved censorship and propaganda, that is described later in this document [16] here. According to the investigative journalism website Declassified, CIR’s accounts suggest that Burley and Rutland undertake similar work at CIR that they previously undertook in the Foreign Office. Other named board members and employees have worked in British and overseas intelligence services, and at NATO strategic communications. The UK government has funded CIR by £2.7 million since 2021 [17] here. CIR website states that it has no core funding but is paid for projects; it does not accept individual donations over £500. The website further states that it has received grants from UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO); US Department of State, USAID; and the Australian government [18] here.

In a statement to Declassified CIR stated that “We carry out projects that are aligned with our core values of supporting and defending human rights and democracy…we believe the explosion of disinformation and online harms has eroded trust within society and for democracy”. They further stated that they work with governments, academia, other NGOs and volunteers [19] here.

Projects on the CIR website were examined in order to assess their interests. In January 2022, CIR launched an “Eyes on Russia” project to verify and list Russian war crimes in Ukraine. However, CIR did not verify the contested numbers of deaths and serious injuries that are not war crimes, i.e. the death of Ukrainian military personnel, which tragically may be in hundreds of thousands. These lives could have been saved if the US and the UK had allowed a peace treaty between Ukraine and Russia in 2022 [20] here. In Afghanistan CIR focused on verifying Taliban abuses, but did not investigate possible war crimes by British and American forces in that country. In November 2023 Burley writes in the online American magazine Politico that Elon Musk’s Twitter/X had published ‘unverified’ claims about the Israeli assault on Gaza, stating that such rapid publication of information could not be relied upon [21] here. There is no evidence on the CIR website of an ongoing war crimes verification project in Gaza. Clearly, the verification of facts by CIR is influenced by funding, with clients selecting information to be investigated that is in their own political interest. It is in essence creating content and censoring dissenting opinion that coincide with the political ambitions of its paymasters.

CIR works with various news outlets in UK and overseas, including the BBC, the Guardian, the Financial Times, and the New Statesman; however, although the CIR is frequently quoted in the UK media, it is presented as independent and its funding sources and links with governments and intelligence services are rarely mentioned [22] here.

The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD)

The think tank ISD calls itself a world-leading authority on global security, political risk and military conflict. It states it is ‘Powering solutions to extremism, hate and disinformation’. It was described by American journalist Matt Taibbi as one of the 50 most important actors in the Censorship Industrial Complex [23] here.

The ISD has offices in London, plus others in Washington DC., Berlin, Amman, Nairobi, and Paris. It states that it works with the European Community and 12 other governments; it claims to work with 32,000 activists and social influencers, supporting and training 40 governments and hundreds of cities worldwide [24] here. Its counter-disinformation work focuses on electoral, climate, public health and conspiracy networks. Its programmes include a Digital Policy Lab that brings together policy makers from ‘key liberal democratic countries’, and in this capacity it has reviewed Europe’s Digital Services Act and UK’s Online Safety Act [25] here. ISD also operates a media literacy programme ‘Be Internet Citizens [26] here.

ISD’s funders include 36 governments and government departments, including the American German Marshall Fund, the UK’s FCO and Home Office, and Ofcom. It is also funded by 34 large foundations and NGOs including the British Council, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Omidyar and Open Society Partnership. It has links with social media giants including Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Spotify, and YouTube [27] here.

American journalist Matt Taibbi states that ISD offers a ‘smorgasbord’ of content suffocation tools, such as a ‘hate-mapper’ service and a product called Beam which is a ‘multi-lingual, multiplatform organisation developed to expose, track and confront information, threats online, identifying ‘bad actors’ and ‘extremist actors’. Amongst other accusations, Taibbi states that ISD was instrumental in getting activists accused of criminal activity, but not convicted, removed from social media [28] here. These controversial and political events surrounded a contested election result in the USA.

On examining the ISD content, narratives closely follow those that are circulated by Western governments. For example, on climate issues one article reports on how wellness and new age influencers serve the anti-climate narrative [29] here, presenting such persons in a negative manner. There was no acknowledgement that even esteemed climate scientists hold a wide range of opinions. A report from Australia concerning protests against drag queen events in libraries for children describes protesters as ‘established extremist actors’ such as the far right and conspiracy theorists, or parents who are intolerant of LGBTQ+ people. The protests that the ISD report criticises appear to be normal lobbying activities, such as attending school meetings, producing flyers, and email campaigns [30] here. A ISD report on antisemitism uses the controversial International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition. It describes posts critical of George Soros as antisemitic [31] here, although it is normal for some people to criticise anyone with immense wealth and a political agenda, irrespective of their religion. A report on Covid-19 called dissenting opinions ‘disinformation’ and ‘hateful’, and linked dissent to anti-Chinese, antisemitism, anti-immigration, anti-government, and terrorism motivations [32] here, although many making these types of statements were well qualified to do so. ISD reported the campus protests at American universities as being weaponised by foreign actors, including the Chinese. The report stated that these foreign actors are capitalising on the United States as it is beset with social and political turmoil [33] here, although protesters were non-violently trying to bring attention to an alleged genocide, in which the US government was complicit.

As an example of ISD influence, a document was sent to MPs in May 2024, explaining risks linked to conspiracy theories. The report explains that such theories are built of misinformation and disinformation that fill people’s gaps in knowledge. The study also linked those who hold such opinions as suffering from mental disorders, insecurity, narcissism, particular ideology, and antisemitism. The ISD report describes conspiracy theories as a threat to democracy [34] here.

This report appears as a media literacy campaign to ‘inoculate’ busy MPs so that they do not take genuine concerns of constituents seriously. However, some of the suggested conspiracy theories in this document are based on real concerns, for example, the chapter on Global Control, The Great Reset and the New World Order. The Great Reset is being led by the World Economic Forum (WEF). The WEF claims it plans to create a fairer and better world, but the only persons who have been allowed to join the WEF debate so far are the immensely wealthy and powerful. Additionally, when trying to check if a debate between those with opposing views on WEF policy had appeared on mainstream media, no such debates were found. As opposing political parties support WEF policies, constituents cannot vote to alter the political direction. Many constituents are well informed and have a democratic right to discuss their concerns with their parliamentary representative without being labelled as unstable, narcissistic, or antisemitic.

The Institute of Statecraft and the Integrity Initiative.

The Integrity Initiative was part of the Institute of Statecraft which was a registered charity in 2016 with a registered head office in an abandoned, derelict mill in Scotland. They also had an office suite at an exclusive address in central London, although this has a lower profile. It was part of the UK’s ‘counter disinformation’ unit, with a focus on Russian disinformation. It set up clusters in European countries staffed by ‘people who understand the threat posed to Western nations by a flood of disinformation’ [35] here. It was heavily funded by the British government; leaked documents revealed that they received £296,500 public funding in 2016/17, with expected funding for £1,961,000 the following year [36] here. At that time, the Institute’s ‘cluster members’ included Chris Donnelly, who had previously advised four secretaries-general of NATO, and several FCO researchers of the former Soviet Republic [37] here.

In 2018, the Integrity Initiative was found to have launched political attacks on the Labour Party and its then leader, Jermy Corbyn [38] here. According to academic David Miller, then a professor of Political Sociology at Bristol University, the initiative appeared to be a ‘military directed push’ [39] here. Thus, public funds were being used by the party in power to influence public perception of the party in opposition.

The Integrity Initiative stated that one of its aims was to educate the young on disinformation and threats [40] here, i.e. it was involved in media literacy. After leaks of the Integrity Initiative’s nefarious activities, it was closed down in November 2018. It was claimed that these leaks were part of a Kremlin action to discredit the UK government [41] here. However, when a project is discredited, it can be renamed, and the activities continued elsewhere.

Open Information Partnership (OIP).

The British government stated that it was investing £100 million pounds to counter foreign disinformation, particularly concerning Russia [42] here, and hence it was likely to find other routes in which to invest after the closure of the Integrity Initiative. Some of the same style of ‘clusters’ with an anti-Russian rhetoric, as were found in the Integrity Initiative, can now be found in the OIP project, that is funded by the UK government. OIP was founded in February 2019, shortly after the Integrity Initiative closed down.

OIP describes itself as a diverse network of organisations and individuals united in determination to expose and counter disinformation [43] here. In 2020 OIP partners included the Zinc Network, that has been linked to censorship activities related to an American journalist and politician [44] here. Zinc was named in leaked documents from the Institute of Statecraft as associated with the discredited Integrity Initiative. Its other partners were the fact check organisation Bellingcat whose staff include British and American ex-military and intelligence staff, the NATO linked DFRLab, and the Media Diversity Institute (MDI), also linked to the discredited Integrity Initiative. Bellingcat, DFRLab, and MDI are no longer found on the OIP website as partners. Bellingcat has operated out of Amsterdam since 2018, and will be analysed in the European section of this study.

OIP was solely funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UKFCO) until 2025; according to a report by journalists McEvoy and Curtis it received £12.75 million between 2018-2021, plus funding from the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund [45] here. OIP is linked to at least 40 fact check platforms, NGOs, tech companies and media groups mostly situated in Eastern Europe and most with anti-Russian attitudes. OIP’s stated mission is to expose and counter disinformation, stating ‘Our partners and member organisations work tirelessly to combat the spread of disinformation – conducting research, analysis, and investigations, producing reports, publishing articles and developing tools and methodologies’ [46] here. OIP has links to the CIR, for example, Ross Burley, one of the directors of the CIR and a previous intelligence asset was involved in the launch of OIP and sits on the OIP board [47] here. Nina Jankowicz, known as a disinformation specialist who has extensively written about Russian ‘fake news’ also sits on the board. She has been heavily criticised for her censorship activities by American journalists investigating the Censorship Industrial Complex [48] here. OIP files leaked to the news website The Canary show the UKFCO coordinates multi-agency programmes including the OIP and the BBC charity Media Action as a propaganda programme [49] here.

According to the investigative journalism website Grayzone, these leaked documents reveal that the UKFCO programme is designed to cover up factual NATO criticism, by describing such factual reports as disinformation. The activities include exerting coordinated pressure on social media and digital media companies to ‘moderate’ such speech, describing them as originating from ‘Kremlin-backed’ sources [50] here. Copies of the leaked documents are available on the Canary and Grayzone websites. However, having learned the risks of interfering in national politics through the Integrity Initiative downfall, no reports of such activities undertaken by OIP were found.

The Global Disinformation Index (GDI)

GDI is a British not-for-profit that fulfils contracts and states that it ‘exists to disrupt online disinformation’ [51] here. It claims that it offers transparent, independent, and neutral disinformation risk ratings across the web. Its method is to disrupt the business model of organisations that it accuses of transmitting disinformation. It was founded in the UK in 2018 by Dr Daniel Rogers, a professor at New York University, who had previously worked in US intelligence services. It has links with the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), an American soft power organisation that took on parts of the CIA’s operations when NED was formed. GDI holds a strong pro-NATO position. For example, in a 2022 GDI report on anti-democratic and anti-Ukrainian disinformation, the report included information that is historically accurate, such as ‘Ukrainians are killing civilians’ and ‘there was a coup d’etat in 2014 [52] here, describing these accurate reports as false.

According to the website Influence Watch, GDI has received funding from various foundations including Luminate, Craig Newmark Foundation, Knight Foundation, the Open Society, the Disinfo Cloud, plus the United Kingdom government [53] here.

GDI states that its open-source intelligence hub tracks disinformation and extremism online. It then provides information to government’s, NGOs, online platforms, and the media [54] here. This is then used to disrupt the flow of advertising revenue to sites that GDI claims to carry misinformation or have content that the GDI does not like. The US House of Representatives wrote to The Secretary of State in May 2023 to complain of inappropriate actions by the US government funded NGO Global Engagement Center (GEC), after it had been working with the GDI. The representatives claimed the GEC had strayed from its founding mission through its censorship of free speech and disfavoured opinions. This particularly affected established conservative media – through grants, partnerships, and awards to entities including the GDI and others [55] here. GDI also compiles blacklists of what it describes as the riskiest news outlets. Those considered ‘riskiest’ were again mainly conservative media outlets.

GDI blacklisting has also affected UK media outlets. For example, Freddie Sayers of the online news platform Unherd could not attract advertising revenue - Unherd had been blacklisted because two of its authors were accused by the GDI of discriminating against transgender people [56] here. This received mainstream media and political interest, after which, Unherd reported that the UK government had withdrawn funding from the GDI [57] here. UK funding has disappeared from the GDI website, although funding from the EU and the German government remain [58] here.

Conclusion.

In examining these six large NGOs it can be seen that they have the ability to significantly impact free expression, working with governments, intelligence, and the media. All have links with the intelligence community through their founders, board members, employees, and funders. Without funding from governments, corporations and philanthropy they could not exist. This creates a symbiotic relationship between large players in the disinformation industry, policy makers, and the immensely wealthy. However much these organisations claim independence, without the desire for censorship by governments and corporations, there would be no demand for their services.

Sometimes in their quest to censor, inevitably these organisations will from time to time attract publicity because their activities overstep boundaries of decency. Funders are forced to review their donations due to public or political pressure. This was seen in the case of the GDI and the Integrity Initiative. When this happens, it is simple for any NGO to close down; founders and employees can invest in a new venture using the same contacts, offering the same products, and attracting the same funding. Thus, damage to reputation is not an important consideration for large propaganda and censorship platforms – it is more important to provide a service that the immensely rich and powerful want to use. With the proliferation of new online safety legislation in many countries the demand for their services can only increase.

In my next report, British universities with fact check functions, and individual fact check platforms operating in the UK will be investigated.