The Control of Information.

How the rich and powerful shape the media and control your mind. By Dr. Judith Brown

Europe and its information control tactics – Part 4

“Fact checking is a crucial pillar of the EU’s approach to disinformation. European Commission. Supporting Fact-Checking and Civil Society Organisations.

“The recommendations of the Commission, if implemented, will bring all the people of the world into a global neighbourhood (sic) managed by a world-wide bureaucracy, under the direct authority of a minute handful of appointed individuals, and policed by thousands of individuals, paid by accredited NGOs, certified to support a belief system, which to many people - is unbelievable and unacceptable.” Henry Lamb, The Rise of Global Governance. 2008.

Fact check platforms in Europe.

The introductory section to fact checking in Europe gave an overview of the fact check industry, its reach and the types of organisations that are involved in fact checking. Part 1 outlined the funders of the European fact check industry, although this was incomplete because most in the industry are coy about those that fund their activities. However, it gave indications concerning funding patterns of Western and American government and those of immense wealth that almost completely fund the fact check industry. Part 2 examined the Digital Services Act (DSA) that legalises censorship in Europe and made those who challenge the narrative that the EU prefers into criminals. It also described some high-profile Americans who are challenging EU censorship in 2025. Part 3 examined how the DSA is enforced in the EU, looking at the many NGOs that are mostly directly funded by the EU and the part they play in censorship, propaganda, psychological operations, and content creation. In this section, Part 4, four large fact checking organisations are examined in detail so that readers can understand how individual platforms work, and also how they are funded.

NATO, Stratcom, and EUversusDisinfo fact checking operation.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) structure in Europe in complex. The EU has a close relationship with NATO, and this includes intelligence activities. The NATO website states:“NATO and EU staff…observe and participate in each other’s cyber defence exercises, including exercises organised by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn, Estonia. Exchanges continue on concepts and doctrines as well as training and education…”[1] here.

The NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (StratCom COE) is not part of the NATO Command structure, but is multi-nationality constituted, but not part of the NATO command. It is funded by its member states. It is based in Riga, Latvia. Stratcom operates an intelligence arm that is part of the EU diplomatic service. It is funded by the EU and named EUversusDisinfo. This platform was launched in 2015.

Primarily EUversusDisinfo mainly collects information on foreign interference; much of its fact checking activities are linked to debunking ‘pro-Kremlin disinformation’[2] here, with China also named as ‘another disinformation actor’. Clearly Russia and China, like every other country, will issue propaganda and it is normal for an intelligence agency to collect this information and analyse it. However, on the EUVersusDisinfo website there are some ‘debunking’ reports that are similar to those found on non-military fact checking platforms and not related to overseas threats. These are presented in the form of research and not as individual fact checks. This includes reports on the ‘far right’ in France [3] here; ‘identity driven’ controversial positions’[4] here, Brexit and Covid-19 [5] here., and ‘information warfare’ that counters official narratives [6] here. Another tackles what it calls ‘climate mis and dis-information’[7] here. These do not have foreign connections but consider those with an alternative narrative as a threat, but they are only preferences and ideas that are relevant to ordinary citizens, who have the right to hold such views. The problem is not that people are making challenging statements, but that both the military and the state do not listen to the views of their law-abiding citizens.

Reports of military intelligence that target citizens have already emerged in the UK and the USA. For example, the 77^th Brigade were utilised in UK during the Covid crisis to prevent criticism of government policy [8] here and American journalists investigating the Twitter files found NATO’s Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRL) has been used to censor ordinary American citizens [9] here. The campaigns targeted individuals, both in the UK and the USA, that had no connection with crime, terrorism, or foreign agents, and taxpayers’ money is used to pay for this surveillance.

In addition to the targeting of innocent civilians for surveillance, there is also the dangers of promoting negative images of countries that are considered to be adversaries, as this makes war, and possibly nuclear war, more likely. Some very well qualified people, such as Professor Jeremy Sachs and Professor Graeme MacQueen (now deceased) have made this point [10] here and [11] here. All of the research on the EUversusDisinfo website was adversarial, rather than looking for solutions to areas of disagreement and conflict. Intelligent and thoughtful voices such as Sachs and MacQueen are censored and do not appear in mainstream media, but such voices are sufficiently experienced and qualified to speak to populations to enable them to make better decisions about war, peace and trade, and thus the ability to create true democracies.

Agence-France-Presse (AFP)

The French newswire AFP is the largest fact checking company in the world. As a French newswire, it gets funding from the French government. According to the Foundation for Freedom Online (FFO) it has also received US$9,914,902 mainly in the form of subscriptions from the US Agency for Global Media, the Department of Defence, the Department of State, and USAID [12] here. Its newswire rivals are the American Associated Press (AP) and Reuters, but although both have also moved to the new system of fact checking, AFP moved much faster and now plays a dominant role in the fact check industry. It has 260 news hubs in 151 countries, and many of these now have fact checking platforms, employing 140 people, with 83 Meta contracts worldwide for third party fact checking in March 2023. AFP launched its fact check arm, AFP Factuel, in 2017 and became a verified signatory of the IFCN Code of Principles in 2018.

AFP Factuel is organised from Paris. It also has deputy editors in Asia-Pacific, Latin America and Spain, Europe, Africa, Middle East and North Africa, and USA and Canada, demonstrating its global reach. On its website AFP states that it fact checks in Arabic, Bahasa Indonesian, Bahasa, Malaysian, Bengali, Bulgarian, Burmese, Catalan, Croatian, Czech, Dutch, English, French, Finnish, German, Greek, Hindi, Hungarian, Korean, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Serbian, Slovak, Spanish, Swedish and Thai. AFP Factuel also list technical and investigative staff, and ‘debunking’ operatives across all global areas [13] here.

Not only does AFP fact check, but it is active in the development of the fact check industry. For example, in Europe it was listed as a member of seven EDMO hubs, including De Facto (France); CEDMO (Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia); EDMO Belux (Belgium and Luxembourg); HDMO (Hungary); BROD (Romania and Bulgaria); ATMO (Croatia and Slovenia); MedDMo (Cyprus, Greece and Malta). No other fact check platform or media company was listed more than twice. In France it leads Objectif Desinfox, a group of 21 media organisations that fact check elections, with support from Google France [14] here.

It is also a member of the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN); and the fact check training platform Media Numeric. With other European newswires, it participates in the European Data News Hub that helps to control information that is circulated through Europe and other parts of the world. AFP also states it is a member of NODES, the new European Disinformation Observatory [15] here. It also trains Ukrainian fact checkers in conjunction with APA the Austrian newswire, and Ukrinfrom, the Ukrainian newswire [16]here. Further afield, in India AFP works with the Ekta Election Consortium, and with fact check platform Tsek.ph in the Philippines. In Latin America AFP is part of LatAm Chequea, a Portuguese/Spanish speaking network of fact checkers, and works with fact checker Comprova in Brazil. AFP helped to produce videos in Africa with ViralFacts, a WHO fact checking project that aims at younger audiences [17] here. In Brazil, Mexico, the Spanish speaking sector of the United States, India, Germany and France AFP operates WhatsApp tiplines; WhatsApp is favoured by Spanish and Portuguese speakers.

When examining the AFP website, it shows that the fact checks support official narratives. AFP is also active in fact check training, with both in person courses, but also online certified courses in digital investigation techniques for journalists and journalism students. These are presented in English, French, Portuguese and Spanish. It also publishes short videos on specific areas of fact checking, such as health issues, again following approved narratives. These fact checking initiatives are delivered in conjunction with the Google NI [18] here. AFP is also involved in developing fact checking tools. It was part of the EU funded WeVerify research team that produced the tool INVID-WeVerify and is now part of the vera.ai research team [19] here. It also works with IFCN to extend cooperation between fact checking platforms worldwide; for example, it was one of the funders of annual IFCN Global Fact Summits [20] here. Thus, investigations reveal that AFP Factuel not only has a wide reach in terms of geographic spread and languages in its censorship activities, but it is also active in global networking, fact checking education, the development of fact checking tools, and developing new ways of controlling discourse, both on and offline.

EUDisinfo Lab.

Another large player that has a much shorter history is the EUDisinfo Lab (EUDL), launched in 2017. Although situated in Brussels, it only operates in English language. EUDL describes itself as an independent non-profit, gathering knowledge and expertise on disinformation across Europe. It states that it has active members in a ‘passionate and vast’ community that helps tackle and prevent information disorders endangering citizens integrity, peaceful coexistence, and democratic values [21] here. Its founders are Alex Alaphilippe, and its MD Gary Machada. Alaphilippe has had articles published in on the website of the Visegrad group, presenting a negative image of Russia [22] here. Alaphilippe and Machada lead a team of nine, with a four-person board [23] here. An internet search reveals little information about EUDisinfo Lab staff, but details of one board member Camille Francois were found; she authored “Actor-Behaviour-Content Framework” that influenced major platforms on their approach to online content moderation. Currently she teaches at Columbia University’s School of International Affairs, and also on the board of Grafika, named in the Twitter files as one of the most active members of the Censorship Industrial Complex [24] here. MIT have named her as an under-35 Innovator, and Time Magazine has named her as one of the Next 100 Global Leader [25] here. Another listed board member is Emma Le Mesurier. She is the widow of James Le Mesurier, who was involved with an organisation called Mayday that incubated the controversial White Helmets group in Syria, and who died in mysterious circumstances [26] here. Evidence by independent academics and journalists links the White Helmets to Al Qaeda. The Whie Helmets are funded by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), said to be US$23 million [27] here. Emma Le Mesurier is a former diplomat.

There is no information about EUDL’s funding on its website. The size of its activities and its high profile board members clearly show it must have a significant budget. Its website states: “Tackling disinformation is an expensive task and comes with a large diversity of risks for the organisation, its board members, and its staff. We not only need funding, but we need funding sources that share our mission to maintain our independence to not become another mouthpiece for a particular or partisan political agenda”. EUDL guidelines state it engages with public and private funders, including private companies, foundations, and governments [28] here. Research by McEvoy and Curtis found that the UK government has provided EUDL with £545,369 [29] here. The Foundation for Freedom Online (FFO) website stated that it was funded US $15,000 from the state department [30] here. They also participate in several EU projects, for which they will receive remuneration.

With vague information about its financing, EUDL could be described as a ‘shadowy’ organisation with a glossy website. Its listed activities include research, stating they ‘constantly monitor disinformation across major platforms’ to identify trends and threats. They also maintain a European platform on disinformation, providing tools and resources to encourage collaboration. EUDL makes policy recommendations at EU level to member states based on their analysis. Their outreach consists of an annual conference, webinars, and workshops. Although EUDL describe itself as ‘independent’ this is difficult to verify when it is not transparent, and when it attracts significant funds from governments and government agencies known to be involved in censorship funding.

The extensive list of EUDL publications include reports on AI manipulated misinformation; climate change, health and election misinformation; and the disinformation landscape in countries across the EU, including media literacy [31] here. Their resources section includes hubs on hot button topics such as Covid-19, Ukraine War, Hamas, and Russian disinformation. The contents tend to follow the policy directions of major European and American governments. For example, the information hub concerning Israel and Hamas states there is considerable misinformation being presented by both sides. EUDL names trustworthy sources as BBC , the Digital Forensic Research Lab, NewsGuard, and Bellingcat [32] here all of which are noted for officiously following government narratives, hence EUDL directs its audience to one side of the narrative. It criticises TikTok, X, and Telegram as being unreliable; these allow the posting of stories direct from the conflict. In the Covid-19 hub in 2023 all of the links available are to EU polices [33] here. Their advocacy system includes lobbying for more control of information and intrusive regulations [34] here, as would suit their business model. Their updates tend to follow the narratives as desired by European governments, and do not encourage diversity of thought, nor debate [35] here. Their projects include participation in Vera.ai, EDMO and the EFCSN, all EU funded. They also organise an annual conference [36] here. The EUDL does not lead its audiences to investigate diverse views on news topics, and it is not transparent about its employees or funding.

Bellingcat.

Bellingcat was claims to be an independent group that investigates information. It was founded in 2014 by Elliot Higgins, initially in the UK but is now located in Amsterdam. Whilst Bellingcat is praised in the mainstream media, independent investigators are critical of this organisation that seems to always find evidence to support NATO and Western government narratives in controversial stories, independent journalists and researchers are critical of Bellingcat’s reliability and honesty. For example, author and journalist Alan MacLeod described Bellingcat as “Citizen journalism staffed with spies and soldiers” [37] here. MacLeod’s hit piece on Bellingcat continues:

“An alarming number of Bellingcat’s staff and contributors come from highly suspect backgrounds. Senior Investigator Nick Waters, for example, spent three years as an officer in the British Army, including a tour in Afghanistan, where he furthered the British state’s objectives in the region. Shortly after leaving the service, he was hired by Bellingcat to provide supposedly bias-free investigations into the Middle East. Higgins himself was a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, NATO’s quasi-official think tank, from 2016 to 2019.

Former contributor Cameron Colquhoun’s past is even more suspect. Colquhoun spent a decade in a senior position in Britain’s Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ), where he ran cyber and Middle Eastern terror operations. The Scot specializes in Middle Eastern security and also holds a qualification from the U.S. State Department. None of this, however, is disclosed by Bellingcat, which merely describes him as the managing director of a private intelligence company that ‘conduct[s] ethical investigations’ for clients around the world–thus depriving readers of key information they need to make informed judgments on what they are reading.

Bellingcat fails to inform its readers of even the most glaring conflicts of interest. There are plenty of former American spooks on Bellingcat’s roster as well. Former contributor Chris Biggers, who penned more than 60 articles for the site between 2014 and 2017, previously worked for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency–a combat support unit that works under the Department of Defense and the broader intelligence community. Biggers is now the director of an intelligence company headquartered in Virginia…hat boasts of having retired Army and Air Force generals on its board. Again, none of this is disclosed by Bellingcat, where Biggers’s bio states only that he is a “public and private sector consultant based in Washington, D.C.”

For six years, Dan Kaszeta was a U.S. Secret Service agent specializing in chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and for six more he worked as program manager for the White House Military Office. At Bellingcat, he would provide some of the intellectual ammunition for Western accusations about chemical weapons use in Syria and Russia’s alleged poisoning of Sergei Skripal.

Kaszeta is also a fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, a think tank funded by a host of Western governments as well as weapons contractors such as Airbus, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon. Its president is a British field marshal…and its senior vice president is retired American General David Petraeus. Its chairman is Lord Hague, the U.K.’s secretary of state between 2010 and 2015. All of this matters if a group is presenting itself as independent when, in reality, their views align almost perfectly with the governments funding them.”

Bellingcat’s funders, according to its website, include 51% from non-profit organizations (i.e., foundations of those with immense wealth), 13% self-generated income, which could include contracts with governments, 8% from lotteries, 13% from individuals (this could be large donations from those with immense wealth), and 9% from companies. It names some of the funders as the think tank Civitas, the European Commission, Sigrid Rausing Trust (a frequent funder of fact check platforms), the Startsmall Foundation, owned by Jack Dorsey, the previous owner of Twitter, and two other foundations [38] here. Declassified found it had received US$94,000 from NED in its 2020 accounts [39] here. Grayzone revealed that the EU also funded Bellingcat. It also may receive funds from the British Open Information Partnership, the organisation that emerged to take on the work of the discredited Integrity Initiative. Wikispooks lists additional funders as the Adam Smith International that is linked to British intelligence, a secret Dutch foundation, Adessium, that funds projects backed by Western governments, Google, the American National Endowment for Democracy, often described as a CIA cutout that funds other parts of the fact check industry[40] here.

Bellingcat has been accused of shoddy investigations leading to unreliable reports. These are on controversial topics where independent reporters or academics challenge their findings. The topics include the downing of the MH17 airliner [41] here, the Skripal poisoning [42] here, and claims of chemical weapons used in Syria [43] here. Grayzone provided evidence that Bellingcat had been cooperating with an ISIS blogger [44] here. It has also proved to be close to the British government, for example, a leaked document from a Foreign Office contractor noted that during its 2019 presidential election the UK “deployed” a number of “partners” to the country, including Bellingcat. The following year Bellingcat published an article entitled “Russian interference in North Macedonia: A View Before the Elections” ahead of the country’s parliamentary vote [45] here.

Conclusion.

The EU has a large number of fact check platforms, well supported by what the EU describes as its counter-disinformation network. Here four fact check platforms have been analysed in detail – their activities, their staff, their funders, and their critics. What is demonstrated by all of these organisations is a determination not to stray from narratives promoted particularly by the US government (prior to Trump/Vance), but also other Western governments, and to exclude dissenting viewpoints. What is also clear is that this is not in the best interests of the world’s people, as it leads us closer to violent conflict, and restricts the information that people need in order to make informed decisions. This does not support safety and democracy, as the fact check industry and governments claim.

The next article will look more generally at the remaining fact check platforms in Europe, their activities, and their funders.