The British Government - The World's Number One Censor.
The Control of Information. How the rich and powerful shape the media and control your mind. By Dr. Judith Brown.
Britain and the control of information.
“…but exactly who is held to account, when, where and by whom, remain troubling questions in the study of media, politics, and power.” Schlosberg, J. (2013).
The British government part 1.
The UK government’s own fact check activities.
At the heart of British fact checking is the UK government, which has its own fact checking platform, the Counter Disinformation Unit (CDU) that was initially formed to monitor elections. In 2020 it widened its remit to cover what is described as ‘inadvertent sharing of false information’ as well as ‘deliberate malinformation, misinformation and disinformation’. The government states that this occurs when content poses a demonstrable risk to public health, safety, or national security or when it is assessed to breach the platform’s terms of service [1] here. The CDU was part of the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) until February 2023, when it was moved to the Department of Science, Innovation, and Technology (DSIT). It has trusted flagger status, giving the CDU fast track access to social media companies [2] here. An investigation by the civil rights organisation Big Brother Watch (BBW) found that CDU reviews are handled ‘at escalation’ by social media corporates, which means that contacts are sent to specialist teams, not to the general content moderators [3] here. After considerable criticism of the CDU’s activities of spying on British citizens, the CDU was rebranded in November 2023 and is now the National Security Online Information Team (NSOIT), claiming that it is now only targeting false information by foreign states [4] here.
A further unit, the Rapid Response Unit (RRU), was housed in the Cabinet Office, operating from 2018 until 2022. RRU was described as a social media tool to support the reclaiming of fact based debate. A government press release stated that the RRU would ‘crack down’ and ‘combat false and misleading narratives’ about coronavirus using ‘a direct rebuttal on social media’ or by ‘working with platforms to remove harmful content’ [5] here. Like the CDU, RRU had trusted flagger status with social media companies. The government website explains it needs to monitor information as certain states routinely use disinformation as a policy tool. It stated that the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) had revealed a range of attacks being perpetrated by cyber criminals aiming to exploit the coronavirus crisis [6] here. The NCSC Is part of GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters).
The UK government’s fact checking programme has been extensively investigated by BBW, and their report Ministry of Truth, published in January 2023 gives examples of the overreach of power and censorship. It provided extensive evidence of the CDU and other government departments spying on UK citizens, including journalists, academics, and members of parliament, as well as ordinary citizens. This resulted in the blocking or interference with content that did not adhere to the government narrative, but were not illegal, harmful, nor inaccurate [7] here. The report found targeted speech included criticisms of lockdown polices, covid vaccines, and issues relating to NATO and Afghanistan [8] here.
In addition to the CDU/NSOIT activities in UK, America First Legal (AFL), a conservative activist and lobbying group, revealed documents to show that this unit also influenced American censorship activities in the USA [9] here. On 10 August 2021 the White House hosted the CDU to learn effective censorship techniques.
Their advice included:
· Establishing a dedicated unit to lead government-wide censorship activities
· Enacting legislation for the government to regulate the misinformation and disinformation policies of tech companies, and punish them if they refuse to comply with government censorship demands.
· Create and maintain partnerships with companies to ‘flag’ disfavoured content.
· Use the foreign policy apparatus to coordinate this shared agenda between aligned governments and multilateral institutions.
· Leverage its control over social media to ‘counter disinformation’ and promote leftist dogma.
AFL Executive Director Gene Hamilton pointed to the irony of this challenge to the First Amendment of the American Constitution that guaranteed no government censorship of the free expression of American people. The First Amendment was adopted following the American independence from Great Britain, but 250 years later the British government was engaged with the American administration to violate this constitutional right [10] here.
Military involvement in fact checking.
In the UK, according to the BBW report, the 77th Brigade, a cyber security wing of the armed forces, was used for fact checking operations in 2020 during the Covid-19 pandemic. BBW published an account of a whistleblower from the 77th Brigade, who stated that rather than the Brigade being using to monitor foreign postings, the government was more interested in protecting the reputation of its Covid-19 policies. The whistleblower stated that 77th Brigade monitored and moderated posts of ordinary British people, many of whom were stressed and scared [11] here.
In addition to the 77th Brigade, the Strategic Command (StratCom), part of NATO, is planning an enlarged presence at its new Lancashire headquarters in 2025. The National Cyber Force (NCF) is part of Stratcom, described as a partnership between defence and intelligence, and is already developing links with Lancashire Council, Lancaster University, and the University of Central Lancashire. In recent publicity for the NCF, primary school children and college students were photographed taking part in cyber quizzes [12] here. Although it is not stated whether Stratcom UK takes part in fact checking activities, Stratcom in Europe does.
Government funding of fact checking.
The BBW report, and a further investigation by McEvoy and Curtis published in 2023, revealed large sums of money were paid by the UK government to social media platforms, fact check platforms and tech companies in order to moderate information. For example, McEvoy and Curtis revealed that the government had spent at least £25 million for services from companies that ‘counter disinformation’ from 2018-2023 [13] here. Meanwhile, the BBW investigation had revealed that the CDU had contracts with fact check platforms, including £1,264,342 to Logically and £114,000 to Global Disinformation Index (GDI), and a further £1.3 million to tech company Faculty Science for technical support for its fact checking activities. Resources available to the RRU included £1.4 million for staffing costs between 2020-2023, who used fact checking tools that included a £75,000 social media listening tool that allows users to ‘tap into conversations’ [14] here.
Mind control.
The British government also has a keen interest in shaping the way that people approach information, as described in an earlier The Control of Information report published on 22 December 2024, on media literacy training [15] here. A report by the DCSM dated 2021 states that UK users lack the critical thinking skills to spot online falsehoods, stating that this had shone a light on the harm that misinformation or disinformation can cause [16] here. The DCMS aimed to promote media literacy training within a three-year window from 2021, coordinating, and presumably funding, the existing 170 media literacy organisations that it states are operating in UK [17] here.
The Online Safety Act 2023.
The UK government has also passed laws that legalise and regulate censorship of information. The most significant of these is the Online Safety Act (OSA) that was passed in 2023. It gives the Secretary of State the power to designate and suppress, or record a wide range of speech and media. The provisions also include development of media literacy programmes in UK [18] here. The Act’s stated aim is to protect the vulnerable, including children, when online. The regulatory framework is to be enforced by Ofcom under the provisions of the Act. Regulations includes take-down obligations, age-gating, and executive control. More details of Ofcom’s role in censorship will be discussed in a later post.
There have been many critics of the Online Safety Act, for example, a BBW report [19] here has stated that the Act:
(1) Make social media platforms judge and jury over speech.
(2) The adopted Silicon Valley codes relating to free speech will get state backing, even if they are absurd.
(3) The internet will become age-gated in order to comply with child safety duties.
(4) A common theme throughout the legislation is that the government has sought executive control over previously independent regulatory systems, and hence Ofcom will not be independent.
(5) Personal devices may become tools of surveillance.
Hence, the government is using social media owners as the mechanism of censorship, and requires online service providers, including large social media corporates (named as Very Large Online Platforms and Very Large Online Search Engines), to regulate according to OSA provisions. The links with European Digital Services Act and other EU legislation is clear: social media platforms operating in the UK must comply with EU laws. The Act imposes duties including each operator to provide an annual or biannual transparency report. Penalties for not complying with the OSA requirements include fines of up to 6% of annual turnover and possible suspension of service [20] here. The issues that are not yet clarified are:
(1) How social media content will be monitored.
(2) How social media companies will verify content.
(3) And what threats will affect encrypted platforms such as WhatsApp.
This is particularly relevant given the change in censorship activities by the two largest platforms organised by Meta and X, which make the future less certain. BBW concludes in its report that the Act may fail to help people keep safe online, whilst undermining free expression and privacy in ways that cannot yet be comprehended.
Changes in policing of social media in USA.
Following political change in USA, Mark Zuckerberg, chairman on Meta that owns Facebook and Instagram, announced that Meta was going to end the third party fact checking program on its social media platforms [21] here. This has created challenges in countries that have heavily legislated to legalise censorship. At the time of this report, it is unclear how this change in policy of Meta, and the change of policy of X (formerly Twitter) since its change of ownership, will affect content moderation outside the USA. Some commentators state that this will place Meta on a collision course with legislators in Britain and Europe [22] here.
The collusion of the fact check industry with government in UK.
Undoubtedly, the OSA will favour the continuance and growth of fact checking and media literacy activities. For example, the UK fact checking platform Full Fact’s only criticism is that the Act does not go far enough, citing the government’s failure to address online health information. Full Fact stated that it worked with MPs and Peers to scrutinise the Online Safety Bill and table amendments [23] here. Similarly, the UK fact check platform Logically that has in the past fulfilled contracts for the CDU/NSOIT, wrote in its submitted evidence that the government needed to be more restrictive, for example, paying attention to indirect harms as well as direct harms [24] here.
Policing expression and social media content as required by the Act will no doubt improve the need for social media companies to depend on fact checkers to implement the provisions of this legislation. Social media companies are amongst the most wealthy and powerful corporations; the largest proportion of Full Fact funding is Silicon Valley sources and wealthy philanthropists.; Logically is less open about its funding, but cites governments, defence departments and corporates as its customers, and works closely with the International Fact-Checking Network, Meta and Google. Without this funding, and without required restrictions on freedom of expression including those outlined within the provisions of this Act and similar international legislation, Full Fact and Logically would certainly not exist in their current form, and may not exist at all. The role of UK fact checkers will be discussed in more detail in a later report.
Conclusion.
The UK government has an extremely important role in censorship activities, particularly in the UK itself, but its reach extends to the USA and Europe. Although in early 2025 the role of the fact check industry has been challenged in the USA following a change of leadership, it is unclear whether the censorship activities of the UK and EU will be curtailed. Particularly pertinent in this context is the ending of fact checking on popular social media platforms, including X, Facebook and Instagram. It is very likely that censorship, propaganda and indoctrination programmes in the UK will continue outside social media platforms. Draconian censorship laws that are described as protecting vulnerable people, in effect, have more effect on freedom of expression and the right of individuals to receive a range of viewpoints from diverse sources.
Included in the censorship activities is the use of taxpayers money in funding the fact check industry. This has been done without debate, and without a democratic mandate, with many members of the public unaware of the manner in which information is controlled, and the costs to individuals. The next section considers the roles of the BBC and Ofcom in censoring information.